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Which Baseball Statistic Is the Most Important When Determining Team
Success?
Abstract
The way to measure individual productivity in any working environment is to track individual performance
in a working atmosphere. Individuals who work on a commission-based salary have more incentive to
work harder, thus more efficiently. The best industry which monitors productivity is clearly the game of
baseball, due to its uncanny ability to measure productivity through the countless statistics that are
available. Using these statistics, owners can use information to determine what each player should be
paid for his services. With the advent of free agency in 1974, statistics became vital information in
determining individual salary, with the free agent market clearly setting what each player should be paid
for his given statistics.
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Which Baseball Statistic Is the Most
Important When Determining Team
Success?
Adam Houser
I. INTRODUCTION
Instead of paying top-dollar for home runs and strikehe way to measure individual productivity in
outs, they have found individual bargains who mainany working environment is to track individtain high on-base-percentage (OBP) who have
ual performance in a working atmosphere.
slipped though the cracks of the market. With so
Individuals who work on a commission-based salary
many different theories amongst player personnel, it
have more incentive to work harder, thus more effiis easy to get confused about which statistics matter
ciently. The best industry which monitors productivthe most. This study will attempt to settle the classic
ity is clearly the game of baseball, due to its uncanny
argument of which baseball statistic is the best measability to measure productivity through the countless
ure of team success.
statistics that are available. Using these statistics,
II. THEORY
owners can use information to determine what each
player should be paid for his services. With the
The underlying economic theory within the
advent of free agency in 1974, statistics became vital
game of baseball is undoubtedly the human capital
information in determining individual salary, with the
theory, which states that players will be paid for their
free agent market clearly
productivity; fortunately
setting what each player
for baseball productivity
should be paid for his
can be readily measured
“With
the
advent
of
free
agency
in
given statistics.
by the plethora of per1974, statistics became vital infor- formance
In recent history
statistics
however, a disturbing
on the internet.
mation in determining individual available
trend has been estabAccording to common
salary.”
lished within the conbaseball
knowledge,
fines of Major League
higher than average staBaseball (MLB), which
tistics at both the individstates that the rich get richer and the poor get poorer.
ual and the team level should bolster the amount of
This is important because there are only a handful of
wins each team has annually. According to Gary
teams which can financially support the best players.
Becker (1975), the idea of the human capital model
If the majority of teams in MLB cannot afford the
of investment is that increases in human capital,
best players, they cannot expect to contend for a
which are measured by statistics, lead to an increase
World Series.
in productivity of the team, which leads to an
Within the past 5 years, there have been some
increase in wages.
encouraging developments to renounce the trend.
Theoretically, the team that wins the most
Oakland, Anaheim, Minnesota, San Francisco, and
games should have the best players. Since they have
Florida have advanced into post-season play despite
the best players, they should have the best statistics.
not being big spenders (Lewis, 2003). Most notably,
Better productivity measures (statistics) should lead
these teams have not acquired talent from the cateto an increase in player wages. Hence, the best team
gories of what history says is statistically significant.
should have the highest payroll amount. However,
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previous literature (Blass, 1992) has shown that theoand Cubs among others. In fact, Zimbalist (2003) did
retically the human capital model of investment does
research on this topic and concluded that payroll size
not hold in baseball. This is due to the nature of baseis the biggest factor of teams in the playoffs. As it
ball’s collective bargaining agreement and arbitration
was previously noted however, there are several
process. Generally speaking, Blass (1992) found that
examples in the past few years in which teams made
players are underpaid when they are younger and
it to the post-season without fielding a huge payroll
overpaid when they are older, which is a violation of
(Lewis, 2003).
the human capital theory.
To complicate matters even more, the vast
The profit-maximizing firm will attempt to
majority of teams in major league baseball cannot
field a budget in an effort that receipts are equivalent
afford the best free-agents because of the fact that
to expenditures. However, this notion is skewed
their fan base is limited; hence their ability to
when taking into account the effects of on-the-jobincrease attendance is marginal at best. These teams
training. Becker (1975) has successfully claimed that
are un-willing to increase their expenditures in an
firms will increase their on-the-job-training in an
effort to increase the success of their teams. Rather
effort to either lower future expenditures or increase
they have found loop-holes in the economic set-up of
future receipts of the firm. The type of training
major league baseball, in which several sets of skills
offered by firms can either be specific or general.
are under-valued in the market for Major League
General training increasBaseball players. The
es marginal productivity
Oakland A’s and several
of trainees by exactly the
other teams have found
“Players
are
underpaid
when
they
same amount in the
great success by fielding
firms providing the
a competitive team by
are younger and overpaid when
training as in other
stressing on-base-perthey
are
older.”
firms. In specific traincentage and keeping
ing, the marginal propayroll relatively conductivity of the individstant. Later on in this
ual is increased specifically for that firm. The type of
research paper, I plan to determine if Michael Lewis’
training offered in baseball is general training.
(2003) claim that n-base-percentage is indeed the best
Baseball skills are not team specific; what works for
statistic in measuring the team success, in this case
one team will most likely work for another. Firms
number of wins.
invest in training in an effort to increase human capiIII. REVIEW OF LITERATURE
tal, which could potentially lead to an increase in productivity in the worker, which would ultimately bring
The inspiration I had for under-taking this
the firm more revenue.
research project occurred this past summer, when I
In relation to the topic at hand, teams in Major
read Lewis’s (2003) document entitled Moneyball.
League Baseball gladly spend top-dollar for the best
This book laid the groundwork for which I plan to
players in an effort to increase their ability to win
proceed with my investigations. This book followed
baseball games. It should also be noted that this
the Oakland A’s, a team able to stay extremely comincrease in firm expenditures can be offset by an
petitive while having a payroll a fraction of their
increase in receipts. If the player is successful and
competitors. The way they remained competitive
helps the team win more games, attendance at home
was searching for players with high on-base-percentgames will increase and thus, profitability of the firm
age (OBP), which the market for ballplayers underincreases and the increase in firm expenditures is offvalued. In fact, the book suggested that “the market
set. Thus, in order to field the best team possible,
for baseball players was so inefficient, and the generteams should invest heavily in training; which in this
al grasp of sound baseball strategy so weak, that
case is player productivity, if they want to win as
superior management could still run circles around
many games as possible.
taller piles of cash.” (Lewis, 2003) This quote was
This theory sounds very elitist, and it suggests
not from a baseball front office executive, rather from
that the teams from smaller market cities cannot comthe mouth of Paul Volcker, who led an investigation
pete with the likes of the Yankees, Red Sox, Dodgers,
into the economic situation of professional sports for
30
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the US government in 1999.
Scully’s (1989) results stated that OPS is the
best statistic in determining winning percentage.
However, since 1989 many aspects of the game have
changed, most notably the expansionary measures
taken within the game of baseball. For example,
homeruns have increased at an exponential rate, payrolls have increased massively and the disparity
between payrolls has been ever increasing. Many
aspects have changed, but has theory tested 15 years
ago remained the same until present day?
Cook’s Percentage Baseball (1964) was far
ahead of it’s time when it was published. The author
used economic regressions to question several strategies: such as the sacrifice bunt, attempt to steal a
base, when to change pitchers, etc. The results were
in a direct contrast with those mentioned in Lewis’
(2003) Moneyball. Cook concluded that the sacrifice
bunt and stolen base were strategic necessities for
managers in ballgames. Lewis (2003) argued 40
years later that the sacrifice bunt and attempt to steal
a base significantly lower the amount of runs teams
are predicted to score.
This research project will attempt to answer
the age-old debate and hopefully shed new knowledge as to which single statistic is the best when
determining team wins.

be compiled of team statistics for every team in baseball from the years 2000-04. This data is readily
available at www.mlb.com. I am testing the on-basepercentage in an effort to determine whether or not
Lewis’ claim is valid. The dependent variable in this
equation will be the number of wins that the team has
in the corresponding year.
I have excluded earned-run-average, a very
common pitching statistic, from my regression
because of the fact that it accounts for errors in the
equation. The ruling for whether or not a ball in play
is an error or a base hit is subject to one person’s
opinion, and can vary heavily from team-to-team.
Also, faster players may reach a ball that a normal
player would not make, and still make an error.
Whereas the slower player would not have come
close to the ball, so it would have been a base hit. An
example that ERA is not a very good statistic comes
this past baseball season by the Boston Red Sox.
Between the months of May and July, Boston’s
record was merely 41-40 despite leading the major
leagues in ERA and most offensive statistics. The
reason that Boston did not have a very good record
was because of their atrocious defense they displayed
every night that usually led to a few unearned runs
per game.

TABLE 1
Empirical Model 1

IV. DATA
Dependent Variable
This study will test
Wins
Number of team wins annually
the following hypotheses:
Explanatory
Variables
Teams with higher win totals
BA
(+) Batting average (hits/at bats)
will have better offensive staOBP (+)
On-Base-Percentage [(hits+ walks) / at bats]
tistics. Teams with better
SLG (+)
Slugging Percentage [(hits + 2B + {3B*2} + {Home Runs*3}) / AB]
offensive statistics will have
STL (+)
Percentage of successful stolen base attempts per team
higher payroll figures. OBP
WHIP (-) (Walks + Hits) / Innings Pitched
will be the best statistic in
K per 9 (+)
Strikeouts per 9 Innings Pitched (Total strikeouts / innings pitched)
Field (+)
Fielding Perc entage
determining team wins.
Payroll (+)
Team budgeted payroll amount
The reason why
Lewis (2003) and the
V. EMPIRICAL MODEL
Oakland A’s like OBP so much is because of the fact
that OBP includes walks, whereas the more common
Within the design of my research, I plan to
batting average does not. The ability to get on base
use a simple OLS regression to find the results of my
significantly increases the projected number of runs
study. I will use multiple regressions to test my multhe team will score per game (www.baseballprospectiple hypotheses because of the fact of the very likely
tus.com). Since batting average overlooks this simprobability I will incur omitted variable bias issues if
ple fact, many have argued successfully that batting
I do not run multiple regressions. The data was taken
average is the most over-used statistic in all of major
from a time-series panel over the last 5 years. Tables
league baseball
1 and 2 will be the format for my OLS regressions.
To successfully test my hypotheses, data will
The parentheses indicate the predicted signs for each
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but I felt that they would
TABLE 2
not be good fits in the
regression. As was previEmpirical Model 2
ously mentioned, ERA is
Dependent Variable
Payroll
Team budged payroll amount
not a good measure because
Explanatory Variables
of the fact it is so subject to
BA
(+)
Batting average (hits/ at bats)
errors and WHIP is not.
OBP (+)
On-Base-Percentage [(hits + walks) / at bats]
And since the process of
ruling a play a hit or an
SLG
(+)
Slugging Percentage [(hits + 2B + {3B*2} + {Home Runs*3}) / AB]
error is very arbitrary, I did
STL
(+)
Percentage of successful stolen base attempts per team
not include it in the regresWHIP ( -) Walks + Hits / Innings Pitched
sion. Although I anticipate
that ERA would be statistiK per 9 (+)
Strikeouts per 9 Innings Pitched (T otal strikeouts / innings pitched)
cally significant at the .01
Field (+)
Fielding Percentage
level, it would be biased
explanatory variable.
and therefore, not a good fit. I could have included
Saves, but they are subject to amount of wins. A team
I will also run a 2nd regression to test the 2nd
cannot get a Save if it does not win the game. Again,
piece of my hypothesis. All statistics used in this
Saves would in all likelihood be statistically signifiregression are exactly the same as the above regrescant at the .01 level of output, but they too would be
sion. This model will give accurate figures for what
biased.
high revenue teams pay for.
I will also run a final test to see if I can deterC. Defensive Statistics
mine which single team statistic is the best when
In this regression I included fielding percentattempting to explain team wins. To accomplish this,
age in an effort to test if fielding percentage is imporI plan on testing every explanatory variable individutant in determining number of wins. Fielding perally against team wins. The baseball statistic with the
centage takes some measure of errors into the equahighest concentration of coefficients, T-statistics, and
tion, so hopefully there will be some significance.
significance values will be the variable that I will
However, as was previously stated the process is
conclude to be the best when determining team wins.
completely arbitrary. A faster player may reach a fly
The process had in determining which statistics I
ball that a slower player would not, and get penalized
would test was rather simple. I came across an
with an error whereas a slower player would not
ESPN.com article which a writer determined to be
reach the ball and it would be ruled a base hit.
the most important statistics in baseball. For my
Because of this fact, defensive statistics are not measresearch, I used some, but not all of the listed stats.
ured with as much certainty as offensive statistics are.
There is no concrete, undisputable way to measure
A. Offensive Statistics
defensive productivity as there exists with offense.
Previous research indicates that offensive staEven the players judged to be the best defensive playtistics are by far the most effective way of empiricalers annually are subject to sports writer’s opinions,
ly testing baseball statistics. Hence, that is why this
which can vary from person to person. Although I do
regression includes mostly offensive stats. I chose
not expect fielding percentage to be statistically sigthe listed stats because of the fact that they are all
nificant, perhaps this test will at least show if it is
extremely measurable and because of the fact that
considered important at all.
previous literature has told me that they are important
in not only team success, but when testing empirical
IV. RESULTS
research as well.
The first regression will test significance for
statistics in determining number of team wins annuB. Pitching Statistics
ally. The results are a direct result from the model in
In order to measure pitching, the statistics of
Table 1 above. For independent variables, the
WHIP and Strikeouts per nine innings have been chounstandardized coefficients, t-statistics, and signifisen. I wanted to include stats such as ERA and Saves,
32
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tion is the fact that other
variables are simply more
important, therefore a
Explanatory Variable
â
Std. Error
t
Sig.
statistic like payroll could
(Constant)
-174.417
167.798
-1.039
0.3
potentially be pushed to
BA
-94.887
76.421
-1.242
0.216
the back in terms of sigOBP
403.729
62.577
6.452
0
nificance. However, later
SLG
139.462
30.517
4.57
0
STL
0.062
0.076
0.808
0.421
on when I test each statisWHIP
-92.798
5.87
-15.808
0
tic individually against
K per 9
-0.908
0.731
-1.241
0.217
wins I think I will get a
Field
221.541
171.919
1.289
0.2
better gauge of just how
Payroll
n/a
n/a
0.054
0.957
significant payroll is.
R^2 = .849
n = 150
The second regression
cance values are presented for the first regression
test
will
test
my
wsecond
hypothesis,
which stated
below in Table 3.
that teams with better offensive statistics will have
Within this regression, there are three signifihigher payroll figures. The model for this is listed in
cant variables at the .01 level; on-base-percentage,
Table 2. The results are in the same format as Table
slugging percentage, and WHIP. I am not surprised at
3 and are below.
all that these three are considered to be statistically
This regression only has two significant valsignificant because of the fact that they are all on the
ues:
slugging
percentage at the .05 level and strikeGammons’ list on ESPN.com of the most important
statistics (2004). Also, preTABLE 4
vious literature told me that
Regression Results: Pre dicting Payroll Factor
these three would be among
â
Std. Error
t
Sig.
the most statistically signifi- Explanatory Variables
(Constant)
500268775.63
787317572.62
0.635
0.526
cant (Sommers, 1992).
BA
-278249287.9
358323736.35
-0.777
0.439
It came as a surprise
OBP
15437463.69
294027844.27
0.053
0.958
to me that batting average,
SLG
353576689.88
140287961.61
2.52
0.013
the most common statistic in
STL
215789.271
357458.957
0.604
0.547
all of baseball, had a nega- WHIP
-88916811.67
26554794.19
1.941
0.054
tive relationship with wins K per 9
6581810.157
3391805.723
-3.348
0.001
when I predicted it would Field
-458054278.4
806884175.00
-0.568
0.571
have a positive one. R2 = .241
n = 150
Theoretically, it makes sense
outs per nine innings at the .01 level. It does not surthat teams with higher batting averages should have
prise me that those two statistics are the only statistihigher win totals, but this regression points to other
cally significant variables because variables can be
conclusions. Also, strikeouts per nine innings had a
described as “sexy”, and appeal to fans very much.
different sign than I predicted. The more strikeouts a
Teams with high slugging percentages have extraorteam’s pitching staff has, the fewer amount of balls
dinary amounts of extra-base hits, which include douthat are put into play. If fewer balls are put into play,
bles, triples, and home runs. Because the average
then it should lower the expected run total for the batbaseball fan is fascinated by home runs in this current
ting team. If expected run totals for the opposing
era of baseball, the demand for players who can hit
team are lowered, then one can assume that strikeouts
home runs has increased exponentially within the last
should help teams win more games, as opposed to
15 years. Because the demand for these players has
losing more as my results suggest.
increased, it makes sense that their salaries have
The most interesting finding of my first
increased as well. If those players who have the abilregression however, is the fact that payroll has
ity to hit homeruns and extra base hits are grouped
absolutely no relationship at all to wins, which contogether on one team, theory states that the payroll of
tradicts my earlier research findings and it also conthat team must be high; therefore one can conclude
tradicts the recent history of teams making the playthat money buys extra base hits and home runs.
offs in major league baseball. One possible explana-

TABLE 3
Regression Results: Predicting Wins
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Strikeouts per nine innings were also shown
should be the goal of every owner in every sport. If
to be even more statistically significant than slugging
the goal of an owner isn’t to win a championship,
percentage, which comes as a small surprise to me.
then they are in the wrong business. Most likely, the
Although strikeouts are certainly entertaining and to
team that doesn’t win the maximum amount of games
the author, there is nothing better than watching a
possible will eventually suffer a decline in attenclassic pitcher’s duel, I would have expected the
dance. Previous research the author has done has
owners of teams to place a higher premium on home
revealed that team success is correlated with attenruns than on strikeouts.
dance at the highest level of output (Houser, 2004).
Like power hitters, power pitchers have seen
According to that theory, owners should field a team
their salaries increase at a faster than normal rate in
that wins the more games and the fans will come
recent history. Players entering free agency with the
through the gates. It is most likely going to be more
ability to strikeout numerous hitters are usually
cost-effective to field a team with a lower payroll that
rewarded more handsomely than a pitcher that relies
wins more games in the long run.
on change of speeds and deception. For example, last
For the following regression each explanatory
February when Greg Maddux was a free agent, he
variable was tested independently against team wins,
signed with the Cubs for an average of $8 million per
in an effort to determine which statistic is the most
season. However, Kerry Wood was also entering free
statistically significant when determining the amount
agency at the same time and the Cubs resigned him
of wins per team.
for an average of $10.5 million per season. There are
The above table was not a complete regresmany reasons for this disparity between the two, but
sion, hence excluded is any values for the constant
when comparing
TABLE 5
strikeouts among
Regression Results: Best Statistic
the two, Wood
â
Std. Error
t
Sig.
R^2
averages
far Explanatory Variables
591.768
82.312
7.189
0
0.259
more strikeouts BA
605.572
59.435
10.189
0
0.412
than
Maddux. OBP
285.704
33.741
8.468
0
0.326
H o w e v e r , SLG
STL
0.466
0.181
2.572
0.011
0.043
Maddux has won
a Major League WHIP
-97.222
8.49
-11.451
0
0.47
Baseball record K per 9
7.092
1.417
5.004
0
0.145
at least 15 base- Field
1931
344.736
5.601
0
0.175
ball games as a Payroll
n/a
n/a
5.285
0
0.159
pitcher for the
last 16 years. Wood has failed to win 15 games once
because each of the explanatory variables was tested
in his career. It seems as money was not spent wiseindependently. The variables with the highest
ly in this case.
absolute value t-statistics are deemed to be the most
An interesting result of this study so far finds
statistically significant. Under the above table,
that Tables 3 and 4 do not match: i.e. the owners are
WHIP, OBP, and SLG are the most important varioverpaying for the wrong players for the wrong staables. These same variables also have the highest
tistics. A possible explanation for this come from
listed R^2 values in the regressions. I do not think
simple economics: if the owners are profit-maximizthat it is a coincidence that these are the same exact
ers, they will field a team that can sell out the stadivariables that Table 3 listed as statistically significant.
um everyday. Table 4 clearly states that owners
Rather, they are the most important statistic when
should maximize home runs and strikeouts. Fans will
determining team wins.
enjoy the excitement that this team brings, and will
In relation to my hypothesis, as was stated
ultimately bring the owner a greater source of revearlier, I stated that I thought that OBP would be the
enue.
most important of all statistics tested. However,
However, if owners are profit-maximizers,
Table 5 clearly states that WHIP is more important
they are not necessarily going to field a team that has
than on-base percentage. I think it is extremely interthe best chance of winning a championship, which
esting that the two most statistically significant vari34
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ables are both statistics that record number of base
runners per game and number of base runners
allowed per game. With the vast amount of statistics
available and tested, I can conclude that in order to
win more games, all you have to do is have more base
runners than your opponent. This statement may
seem extremely obvious, but with the recent fascination with home runs, it appears that home runs are not
as important as current markets say they are. It is satisfying to the author that at its core, the game of baseball remains very simple: get base runners on base
and you stand a great chance of winning the game.
Since slugging percentage is not as statistically significant, teams that do not have the capability to
spend large amounts of money can still remain competitive if they invest heavily in OBP, which fortunately for them is still extremely undervalued in the
market for baseball players.
Even Paul Volcker’s statement that the market
for baseball players is so weak and incorrect is
proven to be correct by this theory. Empirical tests
have shown that teams with high payroll’s continually overpay for slugging percentage when in fact
Lewis’ claim that on base percentage is a better way
to win baseball games. Hence, the theory that the
Oakland A’s have taken in the last decade or so is the
most efficient theory to date. According to Table 4,
which measured payroll against statistics, OBP has a
significance value of only .958, which suggests that
teams that spend heavily spend their money in all the
wrong ways.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
My findings show that the best way to field a
team is by investing heavily in WHIP and on base
percentage. Although Major League Baseball is not
likely to expand to any new markets anytime soon,
when they do it will be interesting to see how decision makers build their personnel on those teams.
Recently, Tampa Bay was awarded a franchise and
they invested extremely heavily in home runs and
slugging percentage as opposed to pitching and on
base percentage. As a result, their record plummeted
and their fan base dwindled. Within the past couple
of years, their payrolls have been the lowest in baseball by far (www.usatoday.com/mlb/payroll).
In 2003, Alex Rodriguez made more money
annually than every player of the Tampa Bay Devil
Rays combined (Lewis, 2003). This philosophy error
cost Tampa Bay a chance at being competitive for at

least 10 years. Now Tampa Bay is focusing their
drafting efforts and free agent signings through pitching, defense, and on base percentage. It may take
several years, but eventually I would expect them to
be able to field a competitive team, something they
have not been able to do in the history of their franchise. Although they still cannot afford marquee
players, if they win enough games with their payroll
at a low level, eventually they will start to increase
revenues. Thus they would then be able to afford an
impact player that can take their team to the next
level.
For teams with fixed budgets, which are the
vast majority of Major League Baseball, the ability to
pay players their MRP is extremely important. The
Oakland A’s have made a habit of fielding personnel
in which the players MRP exceeded their given
salary. To contrast, the Mets always have a payroll in
the top 5 and always seem to lose way too many
games by investing in players whose MRP is far
below what their contract pays them. With this information, teams have a sound theory that should allow
them to maximize the amount of wins out of their
given budget.
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